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Abstract
Taking as ethnographic material the blood feud in Albania in the twentieth century, this
article aims to show that both the blood feud and the feud are manifested through the
exercise of violence and according to the defense of moral or material interests of a
group. Nevertheless, they respond to a different logic. The general assumption of this
study is that the values of the feuding paradigm are negotiable; as such, they can be at
play and can be constantly modified even in contexts functionally renewed.
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Introduction
Revenge was and is an arcane principle. According to a primitivist perspective,
it is conceived as an expression of destructive violence, a natural principle and a
rudimentary means to resolving conflicts. It has been defined a form of punishment and
also a juridical institution, but it becomes a bilateral ratio resulting from the reversion of
the offence and the exchange of roles between the offender and the offended [Verdier
1980, 14], nevertheless remaining a moral idea [Westermarck 1906-1908] expressed
in terms of honour, blood and violence. Revenge is therefore a multifaceted paradigm,
scaleable according to different principles. Its effectiveness does not cease with the
establishment of formal law but it is preserved in contemporary societies. It shows that
it continues to be part of the imaginary collective law [Ost 2004] and contributes to
Rouland’s hypothesis of the process of legalization that is the foundation of the common
imperative aim to ensure the regularisation of what society considers essential to its own
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perpetuation [Rouland 1988, 144]. The language of revenge, in fact, presents itself not
only as a useful tool to regulate behaviour but also in its imaginative principle, shaping
new practices and new meanings [Geertz 1977]. For this reason, in the following, we
refer to the term revenge considering it as a semantic field.Nevertheless, revenge, in
its paradigmatic significance, is likely to generate misunderstanding because it embeds
different retaliatory practices. To introduce the chosen argumentative perspective, I’ll
use as ethnographic field the analogy between a blood feud and feud to rebuild it in
an antinomian key.
Our considerations will be supported by the ethnography on the field research
conducted in the 1990s in the Shushicës valley, Southern Albania [Resta 2002].The
hypothesis of this paper is that, as a premise, a blood feud and a feud are both retaliatory
actions between groups and both can be read as different and violent forms to repair
damage promoted by a malicious fraud suffered to re-establish a relationship of mutual
equality between the parties.Nevertheless, a blood feud and feud are different because
the violence anchored in blood feuds takes root in a symbolic dimension that is denied
in the violence expressed in the feud, and because of the nature of the group that gives
rise to the feud is different to that inherited in the moral obligation of the blood feud.
The ethnographic background
In the 1990s, when the borders in Albania were reopened, it was discovered that blood
feuds were being rekindled. There was astonishment and disbelief towards news that
evoked the use of a rudimentary means, according to Spinoza’s definition of blood feud,
to resolve conflicts, in a modern rule of law. These blood feuds were not attributable
to the action of criminal groups, to reprisals between armed gangs, but they were
gjakmarrje. According to the local customary law code, Kanun 1, the gjakmarrje were
part of an institution aimed to control conflicts and violations of rules, based on the
retaliatory principle [Elezi 1994]. For the reason that it was not considered a violation
or a form of violence, even if it caused a series of murders. The retaliatory practice
used to cause damage to others was defined hakmarrje. It has included the idea of take
the law into one’s own hands, responding with ‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’.
The gjakmarrje, blood feud, was a specific form of the hakmarrje, and at the same
time its founding principle. They were part of a sequence of blood feuds in which the
blood of a man, who recognized himself brave because he killed to defend the honour
of his lineage, is paid to keep intact the honour of his kinship group. In Albania kinship
group is called Fis, and it corresponds to a patrilineal lineage, subject to a perpetual
1Referring to the Code of Lek Dukagjini, the customary law of the Albanian people. It is widespread mostly
in the mountains of Malësi and Madhe, in the region of Dukagjini and in the region of Tropojë, but it is
not the only Albanian Kanun. In the Puka region, there was a Kanun. In Mat and Mirditë , in the north of
Tirana, it was common the Kanun of Skanderbeu. Also, in Laberia , the region in the south of Vlore, it was
widespread a Kanun. The Kanun list could certainly be more consistent. All of these are similar for underlying
structures and general rules; the differences are small local variations. In this article, for the citations to the
Kanun articles, we will refer to Patrizia Resta (ed.), Kanun, le basi giuridiche e morali della società albanese
(Besa, 1997).
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segmentation. According to Kanun, the blood feud cycle was divided into three stages:
the murder, the ‘besa’ (an untranslatable word that in this context means a truce) and
the peace. The protagonists of these stages were, and still are, the brothers, both those
of the victim and those of the assassin, those who give ‘life’ to the blood feud. Both the
person who physically "pulled the trigger" and his fis, as a legal person, were considered
responsible for the murder that opened the blood feud cycle and all that followed. After
the murder, a request for the besa (the early truce) occurred. It was granted by the father
and brothers of the victim. The besa was an expression of strength and pride for who
granted it and it implied a temporary undertaking not prosecuting the murder. It was
given to allow the murderer’s family time to organise their defence [Kanun, art.122,
paragraph 854]. The Besa was binding on those who gave it, but who received it had
to participate at the deceased funeral and show condolences to the victim’s family.
According to the same logic, a second request to obtain a longer truce occurred. It had
to be asked by the elders of the village immediately after the funeral. They acted as
mediators and became guarantors for the besa pronounced in public [Kanun, art.122,
paragraph 859]. They could never impose mediation or suggest a solution. The third
phase involved the pacification. This was the most difficult decision; it was rarely
applied and only if many murders were committed; it foresaw the payment of a blood
money as a symbol of fraternal union. The consequent ritual included the forgiveness
ceremony, during which a few drops blood from the two heads of the households was
poured into some brandy. In this way, it was well represented, in a symbolic form,
the undying bond that would unite the two families [Kanun, art. 140]; in effect of this
ceremony, from that moment, the union between the two families was so strong that it
was even forbidden marriage [Kanun, art.16].
The renewal of blood feuds at the end of the Hoxha dictatorship showed how it has been
kept as a practice embedded in the local culture. It was governed by local customary
laws, rooted in the legal habitus [Voell 2003], and, according to Llewellyn [1960], it
can be interpreted as a factor of stabilization for the local juridical culture. Requests
for expertise advanced by 'UNHCR in recent years, designed to assess the possibility
of granting asylum to those seeking refuge in Italy, as in other EU countries, because
of ‘in blood’ , albeit quantitatively imprecise, testify how the idea of revenge is still
widespread.
For the Albanians, the normative force of blood feud was unknown, but they were
conscious of its prescriptive force. If, for anyone who pulls the trigger, the systemic
dimension in which the actions of blood feuds were embedded were negligible data,
the sense of the action and the practice of retaliation relating to it were clear. The
blood feud, according to the Albanian perspective, related to a more intimate dimension,
dealing with the emotional sphere. There is a profound difference between the norm,
the spirit that it represents and the lives of the protagonists. The detailed description
proposed in the Kanun cools the imagination and it leads into the error of considering
it a perfect system. Instead, it is a complex phenomenon that discloses a range of
procedural variations, often ignored by the people involved in the blood feud. These
latter perceived the blood feud in its dramatic human dimension, as a disaster, as a tragic
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and an inevitable event, as a disgrace to the family involved. The family involved was
forced to impossible alternatives: it had to choose whether to be exterminated to cleanse
the honour, or be cancelled and socially despised if the honour it was not cleansed by
the male members of the family. For an Albanian the blood feud appears as a rational
behavior or as the result of a rational choice made by the members of society [Keiser
1986, 490], rather than being a traditional rule. It is probably for this reason that any
attempt to interdict the blood feud exclusively on the legislative dimension, as yet, has
not had the desired effect.
The use of the blood feuding practice was stopped shortly after the mid 1900s through
the new code promulgated by Enver Hoxha in 1952, in which was affirmed the principle
of criminal responsibility of the person. This principle reversed the meaning of the
Kanun, based on the collective responsibility of the fis.
The dictator, after coming to power, attributed to his law, and only to it, the right to
punish. In this way he prohibited the blood feud. To achieve the break in current blood
feuds and prevent future ones, it was necessary to provide a substitute in order to allow
the people involved in blood feuds to give up the bloodshed without ignominy. To this
purpose, Hoxha used to his advantage the words of tradition. He prohibited the exercise
of the blood feud in the spirit of the customary order that he intended to prohibit. He
proclaimed himself father of the nation, thus exercising the functions of head of the
household, the one who had the right and the duty to promote blood feuds, but also the
one to accept peace. The violent arrogance through which he ruled the country did the
rest. But with Hoxha’s death, as many wrote, the blood feuds which were previously
interrupted, were rekindled.
Pain, death and fear reappeared and young people, who had only known blood feuds
as hearsay began to follow. There was an upsurge in murders for blood feuds and as
a result, in 2001, it was necessary to increase the punishment for this specific type of
crime. Through Art. 78 of the Criminal Code, the same punishment was inflicted for
Gjakmarrje and Hakmarrje: a prison sentence from 20 years to a life sentence. Again,
the measure was ineffective and blood feuds continued. Despite the fact that reliable
statistics are not available, blood feuds extend themselves through several generations.
In the country it was clear that the phenomenon was in constant growth and it was
necessary to implement a series of measures, both legislative and political. In 2005,
ex lex n.9389, the State intervened by setting up a specific institute, the Coordinating
Council in the Fight against Blood Feuds and in 2013 it amended Art. 87 of the Criminal
Code in order to distinguish between the punishment to be imposed in the case of
Hakmarrje, a form of revenge that does not involve murder, and Gjakmarrje, the blood
feud. For the latter, the sentence was increased from a minimum of thirty years of
imprisonment up to a life sentence. This brief description confirms, after more than
ten years of fieldwork conducted in Albania about blood feuds [Resta 2002], how this
latter is a procedure that makes it possible and thinkable in a retaliatory act at a judicial
level [Pospisil 1971] different from State law. What kind of order can be ascribed to
the rules governing the vindicatory procedures: if revenge be a form of punishment
or on the contrary should it be written in the plurality of rights that make up the
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network that guides individual actions based on the choices that the subject performs?
[Vanderlinden 1993] These are issues that make up the hermeneutic puzzle that delimit
the investigation.
The regulatory framework in which revenge is inscribed, whether or not it be interpreted
as an expression of legal pluralism which Griffiths [1986] meant it to be the normal
condition of every society, or a specific manifestation of the locality, the fact remains
that the presence of blood feuds in the contemporary western context imposes an
additional reflection in legal anthropological studies, which calls into question the
distinction between the feud, an expression generally referring to the clash between
mafia gangs, and the founding principle of blood feuds. To illustrate better this
distinction, it would be appropriate to retrace, though summarily, the debate on the
topic.
The Blood Feud
Given the expression of a form of vindictive justice [Terradas Saborit 2008], the blood
feud is inscribed in an articulated sense of order, the understanding of which can be
supported by an interdisciplinary approach.
In the legal approach, the issue has been analysed through the relationship between
the punishment practices adopted in societies in which political power is diffused, and
afflictive punishments adopted in state societies [Sacco 2007]. On the other hand, in
an anthropological and legal anthropological approach, the main categories to analyse
revenge issues are reciprocity and exchange. These latter categories have been used in
two different perspectives. The older, the structural functionalist theory, has interpreted
the blood feud as «a structural movement between political segments by which the
form of the … political system … is maintained» [Evans Pritchard 1940, 158]. This
interpretation has had the same alternating fate of the functionalist theory and was
ignored at the end of the 20th century. The second perspective, a dynamic one, has
interpreted the blood feud as a system or sub-system for the exchange and the social
control of violence [Verdier 1980]. Making use of comprehensive reading, Verdier
explains the blood feud not as a phenomenon, but he focuses the analysis of the
relationships that it presupposes, in the political dynamic in which it occurs and in the
ethical dimension to which it refers. According to his global approach, blood feud has
been justified as a relationship based on exchange. It is the latter that, in Verdier’s
hypothesis, structures the whole blood feuding system, i.e. a system able of handling
a sacred norm for society, laying it on the logic of reciprocity [Verdier 1980]. The
articulation system allows blood feud to be read as ethics, but also as a social code and
even as a power instrument. As ethics since it represents the founding values of a society
that practices it; as a social code because it prescribes rules and rituals to undertake,
carry on and conclude the blood feuding action and finally as a power instrument for
the reason that it is beneficial to identify the social units and the blood feuding groups
that delimit each other in the blood feud. In this way, the blood feud transcends itself
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to appear as the set of regulated and ritualised actions, ideas and values that perform
the feuding act [Verdier 1980].
The L.’s blood feud, which started in the first half of the twentieth century 2 in Southern
Albania, was still alive in the memory of descendants in the late 1990s. The conflict
arose over some pastures and involved two fis living in neighbouring towns. The first
fis consisted of six brothers and this was the reason why they felt so courageous. The
second fis assumed rights on the grazing land because it was within the town borders of
Gjormë, where they resided. The conflict degenerated: one of the six brothers murdered
the father of the Gjormë shepherds. The blood feud was immediate. The victim's sons
responded by shooting one of the six brothers. They refused to grant the besa as forseen
by the Kanun. In this context, it is related to a 24-hour truce. The five surviving brothers,
in turn, denied again the besa, and killed one of the first victim’s sons. They buried the
corpse under a pile of stones: a sign of extreme insult. It was during this time that two
of them were arrested. The stronger of the two died unable to stand the imprisonment.
Three years later, the other brother was released and he joined the partisan forces. After
the war the communist regime proposed, in this as in other cases, the pacification,
suggesting a mediation between those fis. As each fis had two dead men, the pacification
was possible. In the count of the persons murdered, the brother who died in prison was
included because he was been imprisoned for the blood feud.
The L.’s blood feud seems to confirm the Verdier hypothesis: the two groups behaved
according to some values that still seem to be embedded in the Albanian culture as
solidarity between brothers. They fought each other drawing the line between enemies
and allies. In the end, they showed the prescriptive force of the blood feud, as they
acted according to the customary rules. On the other hand, here it is evident Hohxa’s
intervention to pacify the two groups. The dictator’s decision to ban blood feuds in the
Socialist Albania, putting the right to practice an equivalent punishment in the hands
of the State, seems to suggest that the blood feuds could survive only in the context of
sanctions active in societies where state authority and the justice system were not fully
developed [Sacco 2007, 317].
While corroborating the systemic nature of revenge, the case of L. does not deny that
revenge is a primitive form of punishment. [Pospisil 1968, 391; Pospisil 1971].
Once again the blood feud seems to be a thing of the past, an instinctive behaviour,
confined in those preliterate societies that existed before globalisation conserved only
their memory, as an example of a system regulated by a form of incipient law [Redfield
1967,5]. It was considered a form of justice in low complex political system societies
[Hoebel 1954].
The Italian case suggests a different perspective.It is very interesting to reconstruct the
background of the studies about blood feud. In Italy, during the mid-twentieth century,
the national literature has had its own specificity due to the Italian context, where the
southern peninsula and the two largest islands, Sicily and Sardinia, are involved in a
retaliatory logic. The hypothesis made therein shows that when revenge is explained
2
 Direct evidence acquired in 1998, in Lapardha in the Shushicës valley
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according to the local action, the hypothesis about revenge are a part of «regional
theories in the geographical and also the epistemological sense» [Bourdieu 1977,31].
This latter is not the opposite of dominant theories but suggests new elements with
respect to theories that claim to appear as general theories [ibidem].
In 1937, Corso submitted a framework regarding revenge in a specific entry in the
Italian Encyclopedia. Therein, he distinguished between blood feud as a sacred debt
which falls to the siblings of the victim … «negli infimi gradi dell’organizzazione
primitiva» [Corso 2005, 38] (in the lowest levels of primitive organization*), from
the form of blood feud involved in folklore tradition. The focus on folklore tradition,
to which he dedicated a brief paragraph called “Folklore”, is his most innovative
contribution. By shifting the axis of discussion from primitive societies to contemporary
Western ones which declassify blood feud to the rank of simple traditional customs that
have survived «the circle of civilized nations*», justified on the basis of superstitions
that have primordial roots, such as the one that imagines ‘a victim's restless soul
wandering while the stain of bloodshed remains [ibidem]. Corso’s proposal contains
a significant reversal from the juridical stage to the cultural one. At the first stage,
revenge is defined as a sanction, at the second, it is acquired through it’s a symbolic
dimension. Since the studies regarding the local context, such as the Sardinian one,
Pigliaru has analysed the traditional barbaricin codex (Barbagia is the inland area
in the province of Nuoro). Pigliaru has connected the survival of revenge in non-
traditional contexts to the weakness of legitimate power [Pigliaru 1959], however,
he was inclined to consider the cultural habitat in which it manifests itself. In a
short article, he explained the philosophy that inspired his research with the aim to
free traditional culture from provincialism, through overcoming of some traditional
forms which can still be found in the Sardinian culture [Pigliaru 1956]. According
to Corso and Pigliaru, the existence of the feud is still interpreted as a sign of an
incomplete development or inefficiency of legal institutions. The change occurred in
later years, when Lombardi Satriani investigated the symbolic blood dimension in the
peasant/land-worker environment of southern Italy. He suggested that the blood feud
was expressed within a mythical pattern that is the foundation of its legal cogency
[Lombardi Satriani-Meligrana 1982, 329-330]. In this optic, the danger of the murdered
victim or, the danger of the bloodshed of a relative who asks to be avenged, is equivalent
to the mythical configuration of a punishment because of non-observance of retaliation
[Lombardi Satriani-Meligrana 1982, 335]. The feud, although still included in the
criminal system, is anchored in the order of the symbolic dimension, wherever it appears
as a cultural reply. In Italian folk culture studies the two instances have merged. The
first evaluates institutions and norms as products of a supposed cultural evolution. In
this perspective, the feud is a survival that has to be modified, but it also remains
as an expression of a local culture. The second considers the dynamical nature of
relationship between customary law and regulatory practice. According to the most
recent discussions, this latter hypothesis puts the "juridicity" between cultural relativism
and individualistic universalism [Assier-Andrieu 2000].
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Countering the belief that the evolutionary formal punishment for revenge is wanted,
Rouland, for example, digs in the direction that tends to bring out the different principles
which respond to punishment and revenge. In his interpretation, the punishment tends
to isolate the offender from the afflicted community, while revenge manifests the bond
of solidarity that unites the avenger of his group [Rouland 1988]. A widely held view in
literature [Verdier 1984], and on which we shall return shortly, revenge is considered
a procedure not only to do something, such as to restore the blood debt between the
parties; it also talks about something and indicates who are friends and who are enemies.
Revenge tells of the debt that the murderer contracts for his group and also the debt that
the avenger acquires in his group as an agent of vengeance. In the latter sense the feud,
even though considered as a form of punishment, marks the boundary between the rival
groups and at the same time reaffirming the obligations that govern the moral standards
of the community that recognises and acknowledges revenge, using the language of
retaliation.
Already in the nineteenth century, Marcel Mauss supported the precariousness of an
approach that focuses on the relationship between the two paradigms, revenge and
punishment. According to him, the public-private opposition, which controls the relay
between punishment, as an expression of the collective will, and revenge, an expression
of group solidarity, stands in a divergent criterion due to the fact that the first is imposed
by laws, while the second is determined by virtue of the religious unity of the clan
[Mauss 1896]. A second opposition deals with the origin of the action, which in the case
of punishment comes from the «société qui punit» (society that punishes), instead in
the case of feud derives from «un groupe qui se défend» [ibidem] (a group that defends
itself*). Mauss moved the focus from an evolutionary perspective to a procedural one.
The first attracts attention to the feuding changes, the second to the dialectic between
punishment for the crime committed, which operates through the punishment, and the
defense for honour violation, which is entrusted to revenge. This latter perspective has
been shared by Westermark [1906-1908] who has defined revenge as a moral idea
enrolled in the criminal legal culture but recognized as praxis by law. It is an obligation
which remains even in societies where conflicts are regulated by the State. It falls on
the victim's relatives and can, under certain conditions, be replaced by (the payment of)
compensation and in others can appear as a form of sacrifice [Westermarck 1906-1908].
This perspective will be accorded later by René Girard [1972].
The importance of ‘belonging’ is the obvious consideration that “before a number
of alternating killings can take place, there must be groups of people who share a
responsibility of revenge” [Kuschel 1993:691]. The intimate relationship within the
feuding groups shows the opposition between allies and enemies.
In 1995 a vengeance began in a village near Shkodra in the north of Albania; in 2000, it
was still ongoing. This was a hakmarrje, it had not yet become a gjakmarrje. There had
not been the first murder; for this reason the conflict could have be stopped. However,
what was taking place was a retaliation, which might have developed into a blood
feud. Two families linked through affinity were involved. The cause of conflict was
some offensive remarks that a man had addressed to his cousin and to the mother of
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her husband. According to the kanun, the husband should not tolerate this insult. His
wife tried to organize a meeting with the brothers to prevent the conflict, caused by
offensive comments, and lay peace between her kinship group and her husband’s one.
Her brothers living in Dukagjini, north Shkodra, refused to meet with her. The situation
became worse when another cousin apparently visiting, went to the woman’s house. He
was armed; his intentions were to attack his cousin’s husband. According to tradition,
the head of the household must welcome him courteously on the threshold. However,
on the doorstep, the woman’s cousin drew his gun but the head of the household
was quicker. The latter shot first and hit his wife’s cousin in the leg. A wound is
not the same as a murder but according to the kanun it must equally be compensated
with a payment of blood. The risk of the manifestation as a blood feud was greater.
From that moment the head of the household and his only son, in turn father of a
newborn baby boy were forced to live "closed" waiting for a blood feud. Father and
son could not expose themselves or go out, not even for work. According to tradition,
they had asked for a truce but had only obtained a promise that was too fragile, as it
had been granted by some, but not by all, of the male members of the woman's fis.
According to common opinion the behaviour of the woman’s brothers was considered
legitimate, despite their threat could involve also their uterine nephew. According to
their patrilineal descent system, the solidarity is strongest between brothers and male
cousins, rather than between the brothers and their sister and her son.
Not casually, according to Verdier, the whole retaliative system is based on solidarity,
distance and reciprocity. This case seems to be exalted. [Verdier 1980, 30].
According to him, solidarity is an expression of the nature of the bond that binds the
victim to kinship and through it to his avenger. In this analysis, Verdier is in debt to
Radcliffe Brown’s interpretation [Radcliffe Brown 1933, 204], who in turn borrowed
it from Durkheim [Pospisil 1968, 389]. The distance indicates the space as a social
container of the blood feud. By virtue of this principle it is possible to show that in
blood feuds two types of violence are implied. The first aims to protect the group from
self-destruction, imposing as a punishment the permanent or temporary removal of the
offender from his group, the second is the destructive violence symbolizing warfare,
characterised by the presence of aversive relationships, according to Verdier [1980].
Finally, the reciprocity implies the assumption by which the blood feud involves two
complementary and antagonist groups who define themselves as such, provoking a
conflict.
In the case of the 1995 blood feud, according to the principle of solidarity, two groups
were constituted: one formed by the fis of the woman’s brothers and the other by the fis
of her husband’s. Furthermore, the space in which the conflict took shape, had limited
boundaries so that only the two groups were involved in blood feud without exposing
the entire community to the conflict. Finally, the alternation between equal sides in the
fight meant that the wound inflicted by the woman's husband to her cousin, did not
leveled the score between the two groups but on the contrary fueled the escalation of
revenge.
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In this sense, it is suggested that the blood feud is referring to a sphere of meanings
in which the avengers after putting upon themselves the blood debt, having to honour
it to be respected. The currency of compensation is more blood. The obligation in
the retaliation practice compels the avengers in a debt situation; this permanent debt,
inscribed in a symbolic order, produces the mutual violence. The blood debt is the
cohesive force [Black-Michaud 1975] that contributes to keeping alive the blood feud
by increasing it. According to Black Michaud, the debt status regarding both victims
and perpetrators, and also their respective kinship groups, is a sign of the power
relationships involved in feuds. The blood debt that produces feuds, however, can be
developed according to a different grammar. If sustained, as in other contexts [Resta
2002], that a blood feud is a semantic code, it may be possible to assume that it is rather
more just a semantic field. This latter makes the practices imaginable, as an expression
of different disciplinary codes, inside of which the idea of the compensatory dimension
is prevalent. In this second sense, the principles at the basis of blood feuds can be
translated as general principles, applying them to the meaning that revenge takes in
non-tribal context, absorbed and returned by different logics. The examination of the
blood feud literature brings to the conclusion that the blood feud is the principle from
which derives the retaliatory practice in which the feud is defined.
The feud
In contemporary dictionaries and in specialised literature, there is no significant
difference between feud, which is blood feud, and blood feud, which is feud. In this
last part of the essay, sharing Peters’ proposal, it would be appropriate to distinguish
between the two conceptual fields [Peters 1967, 265], and paraphrasing Kuschel, I shall
propose to bring order in the uncritical use of apparently equivalent terms [Kuschel
1993, 690]. This misunderstanding is caused by the fact that both the feud and the
blood feud have been interpreted as a moral obligation, as they foresee a retaliatory
attitude, justified on the basis of defending the honour, the name and the blood of a
group. Finally, starting from the latter consideration, I will try to argue that feud can be
generically defined as the right e/o duty to avenge a wrong by those who have suffered
an offense, while blood feud is defined as the response to a murder by a group that
purports that blood be given back.
In languages where the two terms have distinguished meanings, such as Italian, these
latter evoke an opposition linked to the dichotomy between simple/complex. Vendetta
keeps the sense of a founding principle, as the origin of the evolution of punishment
systems, whereas feud has a more functional meaning, usually linked to the exercise
of a criminal practice. This hypothesis has long emerged among scholars studying
revenge [Lasswell 1931, 220]. In fact, there is an inexistence of support, both theoretical
and ethnographic, which would helps to scale the meaning attributed to the different
terms used to express the feuding action. Whether power, honour, consideration, self-
worth, feelings, value or wealth are the reasons of the action, the meaning universally
attributed to revenge does not change. The last considerations reflect on the principle
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of solidarity, distance and reciprocity. The data derived from the Albanian case have
shown the importance of the sibling solidarity in the blood feuding system. In fact,
the ethnographic monographs, focused on the study of revenge or dealing with it
[Among which, Karsten 1923; Evans Pritchard 1940; Henry 1941; Lewis 1961; Colson
1962; Black-Michaud 1975; Boehm 1987; Ginat 1987; Descola 1996; Resta 2002;
Scionti 2011] and the numerous and significant essays about revenge [among which:
Gluckman 1955; Otterbein and Otterbein 1965; Peters1967; Descola 1993; Kuschel
1993; Tsantiropoulos 2008], have a common denominator: the existence of two rival
groups, who are equivalent but at the same time complementary and antagonistic. For
example, in Albania the force expressed by family bonds has derived from the fact that,
in blood feud, the action was independent by the individual will. Through the exercise of
blood feud, the group has kept and defended its own rights. In this way, it has defended
itself and its offended identity. In the avenger’s position, it was irrelevant if the person
acted by himself or for his kinship group. In the blood feud, the individual’s blood has
flowed into the group and the group has flowed into the individual, becoming one.
In the anthropological perspective, the nature of the group is more important than their
size and function. However, it was considered a prequel, which has rarely played a
key role in theories about revenge. For this reason, in the following pages, I will try
to mark out the distinction between feud and blood feud in two fields. The first being
where violence makes itself explicit,it is a key factor both in feuds and blood feud,
the second deals with the articulation of the belonging (or grouping) rules, which are
the basis for the formation of groups. First, I will examine two elements of retaliatory
violence: duration and intensity [Pospisil 1968]. The duration refers to the extension
of the revenge chain. In the common representation, revenge is greedy and endless.
This assumption is based on the premise according to which in feuding societies, each
murder and each offense could generate a retaliation, as testified in the Albanian case.
This retaliation, in turn, has to be compensated by an act of equal violence. The essence
of revenge is thus based on a tautological premise. A single act of violence may not
be defined as blood feud or feud, even if it is inspired by a feuding sentiment, such as
blood feud and feud were both already an answer to a received offense. Pospisil, for
example, has set a limit. A retaliatory action can be defined as revenge when there are at
least three murders in sequence [Pospisil 1968]. The retaliation can die down in a short
cycle, or it can last a long period, reactivating itself also after a period of latency. Evans
Pritchard, for example, by analyzing the Nuer feud has stressed the extended duration
of revenge. It is difficult to foresee the conclusion of the duration, but its end is certain.
The idea that violence has a duration involves the consideration that it has a beginning
but also an end. On the other hand, all societies have developed procedures aimed
to limit retaliatory violence, both when there is a punishment given by a judge and
when there is the payment of the blood money. According to Verdier, the blood money
is a means to replace the counter-offense with a counter-gift, without changing the
reciprocity between the parties and their internal solidarity [Verdier 1980, 28]. Far
from standing as a stage in the evolution of revenge into the punishment the blood
money appears to be a complex code. The involved compensation is not a means to
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quantify the punishment inflicted to one of the two parties, nor a means to turn blood
into a commodity. The payment of the blood money, however, can turn the conflict
into alliance and in this way it can stop the blood feud and the feud cycle. It does not
invalidate their meaning. Rather, it shows that it is not a violent and self-perpetuating
mechanism, but it is part of social dynamics. Social dynamics shape revenge, setting
its timing and performance methods and generates the dispositions through which the
social agents decode its meaning.
It is different the discussion regarding the intensity of the violence. In my hypothesis, it
is referring to the aim pursued by the feuding group, in feud; instead it is proportional to
the reaction of «public sentiment» [Pospisil 1968, 389], it is believed as an equivalent
response to the damage suffered, in blood feud. In this perspective, the intensity
becomes the measure of the violence exercised on the basis of a right that the community
considers as appropriate. A right deriving from the obligation to protect the group to
which it belongs. The violence seems justifiable and almost reasonable when it acts
in defense of the identity. Therefore, it becomes a instrument of legitimate retaliation.
The belonging is, in this case, a huge container of potential conflict and a criterion to
justify violence. The latter acts on the basis of a bond felt and experienced as generative.
A bond, able to erect barricades, identify enemies and prohibit mediation. The theatre
of the bloody ethnic wars that involved Africa and Europe at the end of the twentieth
century, was the dramatic stage on which the ability to multiply and identity power and
rhetoric of belonging was exhibited. The rhetoric identity has more strength in blood
feuds because it is justified by the need to fulfill the sacred obligation of cleansing the
shame of the potential prejudice of the blood of his own group. It is less influential in the
feud because, in the proposal we are advancing the stimulus retaliatory action does not
arise from the outrage of blood but from the defense of common interests of the group.
In the years of difficult Albanian reconstruction, in the internal area of Vlora, vast
agricultural areas were planted with marijuana. Every family cultivated their own
field; each of them, individually, harvested, packaged and exported the product. The
profits remained in the hands of the family and was managed on behalf of the group.
Periodically, the police intervened to burn some crops.
When the field of the family of H., together with the ones of the neighbouring
families, was burnt, everyone expected that the owners would take feud for the
injury by assaulting the police officers who physically had executed the order. This
was considered a good behaviour, a manful behaviour. The landowners reacted and
assembled themselves as a faction. However, the other owners whose fields had not
been burnt did not appreciate the attention that was being drawn to the area, opposed the
first. They created two factions with different interests. The first sought feud, the second
not. Since trade was thriving, the first preferred to mitigate their retaliatory violence.
They, together with the second, created a new faction, a group with shared purpose: the
protection of common interests.
Despite the violence employed in its destructive force, in the case of blood feuds, it has a
quality: it is exercised against an enemy to whom is recognized equal rights and dignity.
The blood feud is essentially a matter of honour. In the case of feud, the rhetorics of
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belonging keep a similar function, even though not perfectly equal. Because the feuding
groups gather around a strategy that can also be temporary, binding solidarity into
reciprocal interest, which generates an unstable solidarity, they consider others as rivals
and opponents and whom they challenge in the attempt to overpower and win over.
The dispositions to make violence understandable in the case of blood feud, in the feud
turn out to be modified. The theme of belonging emerges powerfully and it knocks on
the door of vengeance, proving to be the not-so-hidden agent of the whole system. For
this reason the rules that determine the feuding groups formation have been discussed
for last. In this hypothesis, this latter issue is the most constructive one to demonstrate
that the feud and blood feud are based on criteria which act differently. For this, it is
necessary to graduate the meaning that the retaliatory practice has to, in each one of
them, reveal that they act on separate but contiguous levels.
As already known, in societies that adopt the unilineal descent system, descent groups
are formed. In societies with a bilineal descent system, there are not descent groups,
but ego-centered groups, positioning the ego in network made up of the group’s family
ties according to its momentary interests. The temporary nature of the relationships
in ego-centered groups is the key to the issue. As hoped it has been demonstrated in
the theoretical framework about blood feud, the different expressed positions focus
on the existence of rival groups, which are equivalent but also antagonistic and
complementary. The nature of the rival groups has remained undefined. Radcliffe
Brown, for example, has included among these groups the clan, local community and
kindred 3 [Radcliffe Brown 1933, 204]. Hence, types of groups formed on the basis
of different systems, such as descent and residence, and opposite ones. For example,
the clans are formed according to an unilineal descent, instead kindred according to
cognatic descent. Nevertheless, according to Radcliffe Brown, the principle of the
mechanism of revenge is collective solidarity.
Many years later, Verdier proposes a similar pattern. He bases his theory on the
principles of reciprocity, solidarity and social distance and he claims the centrality of
the feuding groups [Verdier 1980, 20]. The question then moves to the nature, stability
and reliability of solidarity to which group members are bound. According to the lineage
pattern, that has supported the majority of the ethnographic literature regarding revenge,
it is assumed that, within the corporate groups, solidarity is maximum because the status
is ascribed, the position is invariant and the pattern of alliances is embedded in the
social organization. On the contrary, solidarity is weak within kinship networks. Here,
members can redefine their ties following the ego-centered logic. This allows them to
change the framework of their alliances according to their choice and to give priority
to some kinship ties depending on their own interest.
According to this hypothesis, there is the belief that revenge might occur only in
societies where group solidarity is deeply felt, that is to say, in the societies in which
corporate groups are made on the basis of unilineal descent. The lineage model has
enjoyed great success because it appeared functional. Nevertheless, its heuristic value
3Emphasis added.
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has been repeatedly questioned [Peters 1967]. Thinking in terms of the distinction
between folk systems proposed by Bohannan and analytical systems, Peters proposed
to distinguish between the description given by social actors and the yield in terms of
the lineage model used by anthropologists.
In the folk system, the reconstruction corresponds to the model through which societies
represent themselves and represent a pattern of relationships in terms of an agnatic
system. In the analytical system, the translation of the emic representation, in an ethical
point of view, provides a rigid analytical framework of little heuristic value [Peters
1967, 279]; a cold approach, unable to obtain the different facets of meaning that
revenge has.
Descola’s ethnography regarding the Jivaro raises other doubts, pointing out critical
issues to which the segmental model is unable to give satisfactory answers. Descola,
describing the complicated plot that characterises the Jivaro ties of affinity, descent and
residence, uses the cognatic solidarity to explain the conjunctural dynamic to which the
pattern of alliances in the feuding system has undergone [1993, 174]. The fluidity of the
scheme leads Descola to interpret Amerindian intertribal conflicts not as homogeneous
phenomena but as manifestations of positions continually renegotiated [1993, 172]. The
circumstance that brings the negotiation criterion into the determination and solidarity
of the feuding groups strengthens and allows more thought about the aporia that has
so far characterised the reflections on revenge. The criterion of reciprocity, that is the
foundation of the feuding system and that is based on the determination of stable groups
based on ascribed status, has also been applied to the examination of revenge in cognatic
societies.
The ethnographic examples regarding this latter are numerous. Here it is sufficient
to mention once again Pigliaru’s historic work. As a foundation of his interpretation
about revenge in Sardinia in the twentieth century, it is enacted the idea that the
insult to honour which moves to a retaliatory action will spread within the group,
following a concentric spiral of obligation that goes from the intimate group [Lasswell
1931] directly involved, in Pigliaru’s uncertain lexicon indicated as “us shepherds*”,
to the more distant ones, “us barbaricini*” [Pigliaru 1975, 145]4. A lax reader might
imagine all Sardinian shepherds feuding with the “non shepherds” and the “barbaricini”
Sardinians feuding with the “non barbaricini” or with the rest of the nation. In fact, the
question of responsibility is relevant. On the basis of the principle whereby revenge is
inherited, the subjects belonging to a group take responsibility of revenge in the name
of and on behalf of the group. The relationship between the group and the subject is
essential. Pigliaru argues that in the barbaricin law responsibility is subjective. In a legal
perspective, he assumes this principle as an indicator of the evolution of the customary
Sardinian code, able to overcome the way to consider the relationship among groups and
the relationship between individuals and groups, that normally characterise primitive
societies [Pigliaru 1975, 149]. This hypothesis forced him to explain the nature of the
relationship that binds the individual to the group, and to identify the group to which
4Barbaricini means Barbagia inhabitants.
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Pigliaru thinks that the feuding agents are related. He deals with this issue in the fifth
"Complementary Study", where he has to admit that the type of the subject's group is
a family group and the binding nature of the relationship which leaves a margin rather
uncertain to the subject.
As a mechanism of reversion of offense between two equivalent groups, blood feud
returns to be strongly rooted in the unilineal groups. The problem is that there are
no kinship groups in a cognatic descent system, as the Italian one, but ego-centered
networks. In this case, there can be no certainty, nor about the composition of the group
itself or about the solidarity firmness. Reflecting on the kinship form and function in
medieval Europe, Marc Bloch touches upon the issue. He observed that in the case of
conflict between two families, it might happen that some of the members were in the
uncomfortable position of being members of both families. Because of this situation,
he considered the family groups as «too unstable to serve as the basis of the whole
social structure» [Bloch 1965, 138]. But, on the other hand, the same situation shows the
already mentioned risks about instability of the ego-centered groups in a kindred. This
latter antinomy risks calling into question the theories formulated so far on revenge.
It does not permit with certainty the identification of the feuding groups and it limits
the effectiveness of the theoretical framework to only the unilineal societies bringing
revenge toward a kind of primitivism. Because of the ambiguity that characterises the
examination of the feuding groups, there might be the temptation to avoid the definition
of the feuding groups as descent groups considering the feuding groups present in
Western and cognatic descent societies simply as groups of purpose. This choice is
certainly more functional, but it does not solve the problem of identifying the rules that
lead to the formation of groups that inherit the obligation of revenge.
Neglecting temporarily the questions about the unilineal descent, it is preferable to
consider revenge as a semantic field and analysing the retaliatory paradigm in a wider
context in which the rules for the formation of groups can be traced back according
to the historical and cultural processes to which they are continuously subjected. For
example, the diachronic perspective, through which blood feud in Albania at the end
of the twentieth century has been dealt with, has allowed to reveal how it reshaped
the revenge field. During the transition in Albania from communist to the capitalist
government, the weight and function of the segmentary lineages have suffered an
alteration. These latter have still yet to organise the kinship system that is based on
the patrilineal descent and virilocal residence. This alteration, affecting the sibling
solidarity, has modified the system redefining the groups in alliance networks similar
to those present in ego-centered systems.
This latter exchange was better understood during the insurrections in 1997, when the
Albanian economy collapsed. During that period prefectures, barracks and the Vefa
places (one of the major holding companies that caused the economical crack) had been
assaulted. At the head of the rebels, there were people who gained acceptance through
the family solidarity. The constitution of the groups, that endangered the Berisha
Government and horrified the western world, reproduced the aggregation scheme used
in the segmentary kin groups; therefore, they were unstable. The groups operated in
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an autonomous and independent way. It was impossible a definitive surrender. In the
same way, the leader’s capture or his imprisonment could not resolve the problem
because new segments originated from the previous ones, replaced them, according to
the segmentary principle. No criterion was able to foresee the new aggregation schemes.
The internal implosion of the group made it unstable, unpredictable, but at the same time
unstoppable and extremely dangerous. The distance between the State and the citizens
was so evident that in northern Albania the law enforcements had to start wearing hoods.
Only the anonymity could guarantee against the risks of feuding; in this way, they could
be free from the assumption of personal responsibility, in the case that one of them was
forced to kill someone during a clash. The code of blood feud and the practice of the
feud were skillfully mixed, creating a hermeneutic puzzle difficult to decode
In this situation, the corporate nature of the groups, the intensity of solidarity and
the function of the new aggregates have been modified. The offense that moves the
retaliation is not configured any more as an insult but as a challenge. In these conditions,
the avengers have used the sibling solidarity to justify an alliance that is still thought to
be based on solidarity determined by ascribed status but instead is based on temporary
relationships related to the logic of choice.
It is here we can find the shift from the blood feud to feud. The avengers have made
reference to the blood feud to take advantage of the existing dispositions, related to the
habitus that have made comprehensible retaliative behaviour, but they pursue a different
purpose [Resta 2002, 150]. The perception of the relationship has not changed and
revenge is still classified as a blood feud. Revenge reveals in this way its strength, that
is being a semantic field, able to regenerate the dispositions by which the feuding agents
orient their actions.
Conclusions
In conclusion, we propose to use the word Revenge to indicate the semantic field which
refers to retaliatory actions; the term blood feud to indicate the semantic code from
which derives the retaliatory practice in which the feud is defined, because connected
apparatus symbolically linked to the blood; and the feud as the retaliatory practice linked
to groups of purpose.
To justify our choice, we started by considering the retaliation principle scaleable
according to different paradigms. Retracing literature on revenge, we proposed the
hypothesis that it is a form of punishment, but also a moral obligation and a system
based on retaliative exchange, to wind up with the interpretation as a semantic field that
generates dispositions, maintaining links with the past, the continuous juridicisation
process where the practice of retaliation is reabsorbed. Indispensable premise to
return the conceptual autonomy that revenge deserves, distinguishing the principle of
solidarity and reciprocity which it responds to by the practice of blood feuds.
We have questioned ourselves on two attributes that we believe are essential, for both
the feud and the blood feud: violence and the nature of revenge groups. The violence,
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in connection with its belonging, contributes to the defence of identity that is proposed
as a constraint under which you can open the floodgates to both wars and conflicts
as revenge based on blood feuds or based on the defence of the group’s interests of
which the avenger feels temporarily part of and to which he belongs. To a different
conclusion, the examination has led to the group formation rules. On the basis of
the different systems in lineage, we have seen blood revenge operated in corporate
groups and cognatic kindred. While questioning the heuristic value of the lineage
model, favoured by anthropological literature, we had to recognize that the paradigm of
solidarity that cements the group for revenge, supports the principle of reciprocity and
social distance in which the system is retaliative, operates differently in unilineal groups
and in ego-centered networks. In the former, blood revenge is articulated as a response
to an insult that affects the group’s honour, in the latter, as a challenge for the group’s
advantage. Differently to what happens in the unilineal contexts, in which the principles
of solidarity and reciprocity distance keeps a stable, functional and meaningful form
to revenge, in contexts bilineal or cognatic, or unilineal in those contexts where the
relationships no longer based on a moral obligation but the practice of scope, the values
in the confluence model of revenge are reinvented and vindicating the action takes the
form of the feuding practice. A reinvention made possible by the generating capacity
in the field of revenge, can produce useful dispositions to decode the new meanings
that revenge assumes. The contrast between feud and revenge can be solved within the
performative process where revenge cultures are not deducted.
The constitution of the different groups, the modulation in the exercise of violence and
strategies of honour which have proven useful to distinguish between feud and revenge
remain the foundation of an institution which helps to support the juridicisation process
perpetually acting in social contexts.
For this, the perpetuation in many areas of the theorem of revenge does not
indicate a contrast between different rights, ‘legitimate versus customary’, but rather
acknowledges and reveals the simultaneous presence of different juridical levels and
the nature of negotiations themselves. The level of revenge and the level of the feud
manifest a mutual porosity. The level at which you place the official rights apparently
remains untouched compared to the levels expressed by the juridical regulations that
support revenge and justify the feud. However, if it is true, as claimed by Ehrlich
[1913], that the centre of gravity of legal development lies in society itself, as it is the
internal ordering of social relationships, it is reasonable to assume that different juridical
levels are always simultaneously present, focused on the reciprocal exchange register
and, according to different angles and specific perspectives, they may appear at times
collusive and other times conflicting. Revenge, as a semantic field, retains its strength
and, as we have tried to show, in different contexts and at different times, reconfirms
itself to be a generative matrix of the dispositions governing different aspects of the
law, thus becoming a participant of the imaginary collective law.
* My translation
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